Accidents relating to entry into enclosed spaces on board ships continue to blight the shipping industry, with an unacceptably large number of incidents resulting in the death or injury of both ship and shore personnel reported over the first few months of this year alone.

The incident:

While discharging an oil cargo from a tanker, an oil sampler (similar to that shown in the photograph) was lost to the bottom of tank 3P. It was decided that once the discharge was finished and crude oil washing completed, the sampler would be retrieved before loading the next cargo into 3P to avoid any potential damage to the ship’s equipment from the sample bucket or tape.

Once empty, the tank was ventilated. Over several days the tank atmosphere of tank 3P was measured using an explosimeter and sample hose. Although oxygen was near normal levels, HC was at 57% of LEL on day one of ventilation and 38% of LEL on day two. After discussion, it was agreed that entry into 3P tank would start the next morning (day three) if the gas levels were ‘less’.

The next morning, the tank atmosphere of 3P tank was found to be 20.6% oxygen, with HC at 26% of LEL. Tank entry equipment was prepared and placed near the tank access hatch; breathing apparatus (BA) sets, emergency escape breathing devices (EEBDs), stretcher and heaving lines. The Master was shown the risk assessment and work permit for enclosed space entry and although the HC LEL was indicated at 26% he stated that the oxygen content was good. It was decided that two crew should go in, each wearing an EEBD.

Two crew members entered the cargo oil tank via the tank access hatch each with an EEBD worn over the shoulder, a torch and a personal gas meter. Several other crew members and the Master were in attendance at the tank access hatch. The lead crew member proceeded down to the first platform and checked the atmosphere across the platform with his gas meter. The second crew member then proceeded down the stairs to meet him. This was repeated for the remaining platforms until they reached the tank bottom almost 20 metres below the main deck. The lead crew member then reported feeling dizzy and heard his personal gas meter alarming. The second crew member reached the tank bottom and instantly felt the effects of the gas inhalation; he also heard his personal gas meter alarming. The lead crew member shouted and gestured to the second to wear his EEBD and leave the tank. The lead crew member felt dizzy and immediately proceeded to exit the tank. The second attempted to don his EEBD and activate it but collapsed soon afterward. Meanwhile, on deck, the Master entered the tank with an EEBD worn over his shoulder.

Although another crew member warned the Master not to enter the tank the Master nonetheless proceeded into the tank. Two crew members on deck donned the BA sets already available at the entrance.

Risk Focus:

Drills and training should be properly planned and be used as an opportunity to assess the challenges of rescue from the variously identified enclosed spaces on board, e.g., can they be accessed by persons wearing breathing apparatus? Training should also emphasise to the crew the importance of raising the alarm when persons are found to be in difficulty within an enclosed space, and that any rescue is properly coordinated in accordance with practiced procedures. The natural instinct to rush in to help a ship mate is understandable but extremely dangerous. It has been reported that more than half of enclosed space casualties are people who have attempted an ill prepared rescue.

Comprehensive record keeping and interactive post drill debriefs will assist in identifying any weaknesses in procedures and promote crew ownership of the training program.

Last but not least, a zero tolerance culture to unplanned and unprepared entry into any enclosed space requires to be rigorously enforced and ingrained into all personnel, on board and ashore.