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Master dies during enclosed space rescue (source: Nautical Institute)

22 Ιανουαρίου, 2017 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο Master dies during enclosed space rescue (source: Nautical Institute))

Accidents relating to entry into enclosed spaces on board ships continue to blight the shipping industry, with an unacceptably large number of incidents resulting in the death or injury of both ship and shore personnel reported over the first few months of this year alone.

The incident:

While discharging an oil cargo from a tanker, an oil sampler (similar to that shown in the photograph) was lost to the bottom of tank 3P. It was decided that once the discharge was finished and crude oil washing completed, the sampler would be retrieved before loading the next cargo into 3P to avoid any potential damage to the ship’s equipment from the sample bucket or tape.

Once empty, the tank was ventilated. Over several days the tank atmosphere of tank 3P was measured using an explosimeter and sample hose. Although oxygen was near normal levels, HC was at 57% of LEL on day one of ventilation and 38% of LEL on day two. After discussion, it was agreed that entry into 3P tank would start the next morning (day three) if the gas levels were ‘less’.

The next morning, the tank atmosphere of 3P tank was found to be 20.6% oxygen, with HC at 26% of LEL. Tank entry equipment was prepared and placed near the tank access hatch; breathing apparatus (BA) sets, emergency escape breathing devices (EEBDs), stretcher and heaving lines. The Master was shown the risk assessment and work permit for enclosed space entry and although the HC LEL was indicated at 26% he stated that the oxygen content was good. It was decided that two crew should go in, each wearing an EEBD.

Two crew members entered the cargo oil tank via the tank access hatch each with an EEBD worn over the shoulder, a torch and a personal gas meter. Several other crew members and the Master were in attendance at the tank access hatch. The lead crew member proceeded down to the first platform and checked the atmosphere across the platform with his gas meter. The second crew member then proceeded down the stairs to meet him. This was repeated for the remaining platforms until they reached the tank bottom almost 20 metres below the main deck. The lead crew member then reported feeling dizzy and heard his personal gas meter alarming. The second crew member reached the tank bottom and instantly felt the effects of the gas inhalation; he also heard his personal gas meter alarming. The lead crew member shouted and gestured to the second to wear his EEBD and leave the tank. The lead crew member felt dizzy and immediately proceeded to exit the tank. The second attempted to don his EEBD and activate it but collapsed soon afterward. Meanwhile, on deck, the Master entered the tank with an EEBD worn over his shoulder.

Although another crew member warned the Master not to enter the tank the Master nonetheless proceeded into the tank. Two crew members on deck donned the BA sets already available at the entrance.

Risk Focus:

Drills and training should be properly planned and be used as an opportunity to assess the challenges of rescue from the variously identified enclosed spaces on board, e.g., can they be accessed by persons wearing breathing apparatus? Training should also emphasise to the crew the importance of raising the alarm when persons are found to be in difficulty within an enclosed space, and that any rescue is properly coordinated in accordance with practiced procedures. The natural instinct to rush in to help a ship mate is understandable but extremely dangerous. It has been reported that more than half of enclosed space casualties are people who have attempted an ill prepared rescue.

Comprehensive record keeping and interactive post drill debriefs will assist in identifying any weaknesses in procedures and promote crew ownership of the training program.

Last but not least, a zero tolerance culture to unplanned and unprepared entry into any enclosed space requires to be rigorously enforced and ingrained into all personnel, on board and ashore.

Man Overboard Fatality

25 Φεβρουαρίου, 2016 | Posted by admin in IMO | ISM | SOLAS - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο Man Overboard Fatality)

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) issued the attached report of its investigation of the man overboard fatality from the bulk carrier Hyundai Dangjin in Port Walcott on 10 July 2015.

The second mate descended a rope ladder to read the outboard midships draft mark while the vessel was loading cargo. He was wearing a work vest and an AB was standing by on deck. When the second mate fell into the water, the AB threw him a lifebuoy, but the second mate was unable to reach it before drowning.

Investigation revealed that the rope ladder had been rigged upside down and that the work vest had insufficient buoyancy for the second mate’s heavy build. With their wrong side up, the ladder steps (folded aluminium) did not provide a flat surface to stand on comfortably. Further, the steps were not good handholds.

A review of its shipboard safety management system (SMS) resulted in a ‘Safe Draft Check Instruction’ being included in the procedures related to cargo operations for bulk carriers. The instruction details the procedures (including permits to work) when checking the ship’s draught from a rope ladder.

Port terminal managers, reviewed the draught survey methods at its terminals. As a result of the review, the reading draught marks from rope ladders was prohibited. An alternate method, using a manometer, was put in place.

This report highlights the broad safety concerns. In many cases, little attention is paid to planning apparently straightforward tasks, such as using a rope ladder. This can lead to important factors and relevant considerations not being taken into account, including the experience and physical ability of persons undertaking the task.

Source: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2015/mair/321-mo-2015-004/

UK – MAIB annual report

2 Αυγούστου, 2013 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο UK – MAIB annual report)

The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) posted its Annual Report 2012.  The 78-page report expresses particular concern regarding accidents caused by a lack of professionalism by merchant mariners and by excessive consumption of alcohol by some watchkeepers.

Important factors in order to avoid accidents on board vessels

25 Ιουνίου, 2013 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο Important factors in order to avoid accidents on board vessels)

1.  Formal risk assessments are not a paperwork exercise to appease management but an effective tool to be used on the job to ensure that all risks are considered and that appropriate risk controls are in place before hazardous work is carried out.

2.Communication between management companies and masters of vessels must be effective so that shore support can be rendered to the vessel in an emergency.

3.   Routine maintenance, inspections and testing of fire fighting and life-saving appliances, including drills and exercises for enhancing crew training in their use, should be carried out effectively.

4.Standard and routine tasks are prone to being underestimated in terms of the associated risk of injury. It is important that appropriate measures are implemented to break down the routine on board and that it is regularly pointed out work that is in essence potentially hazardous.

5.  The importance of wearing a flotation device when using pilot ladders.

6.    Climbing or descending a pilot ladder involves some risk for which crew members should have appropriate training or instruction.

7.   The importance of medical fitness for service at sea given that crew members may be exposed to stressful situations demanding high levels of exertion.

8.The importance of suitable tenders for crew transfer operations and recovery.

9.It is important to follow the permit to work system for entering into enclosed spaces on board and that if there is a danger of falling from height, the precautions for working aloft must also be considered.

10.Handrails should be installed along the entire length of the stairs.

11.Crew should wear personal safety equipment including personnel floating device, etc., whilst working on deck.

12.The dangers of climbing or descending ladders while carrying items in one hand.

13.The importance of maintaining communications or visual contact with crew members working alone or in isolated areas.

14.  If crew members fall overboard or end up in the water due to an accident their chances of survival will depend on the speed of the crew response, and how well the response has been planned.

15.Survival craft and equipment must be in a state of readiness and in good working order if they are going to be effective in saving lives.

16.  Where the ship has a mixed national crew, emphasis must be given to effective communication taking into account both the culture and language factors. This is particularly important in an emergency situation.

17.Navigational watch routines have to be planned to accommodate all duties allocated to watchkeepers so that they are not impaired by fatigue.

18.Navigational watchkeeping arrangements and principles have to be observed and accomplished in accordance with STCW regulations.

19.Regular monitoring of the ship’s heading and regular position fixing combined with thorough navigation by eye and the utilization of all available technical aids is a standard professional requirement. Do not switch off alarms.

20.The COLREGs and STCW are clear and beyond any doubt. A complete navigational watch team is essential if there is any likelihood of the officer on watch developing stress based fatigue.

21.  A certificate from a Classification Society is no guarantee of safety of a vessel. The owners must ensure that a vessel is maintained and seaworthy at all times.

22.A vessel’s watertight integrity should be maintained at all times.

Leasons to be learned on various reported accidents by IMO

28 Μαΐου, 2013 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο Leasons to be learned on various reported accidents by IMO)

Various accidents, which were reported by the IMO working group on the analysis of accidents at sea can be found in below link.

http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Implementation/Casualties/Pages/Lessons-learned.aspx

Draft Text of lessons learned (FSI 21/ANNEX 3) for presentation to seafarers can be downloaded here.

The subjects of the abovementioned accidents in latest FSI 20 are listed hereunder:

  1. Fire in crew accommodation and death of an oiler

  2. fire in crew accommodation and death of crew members following the evacuation of the ship

  3. crew member fatality during deck maintenance

  4. man overboard/falling overboard while rigging pilot ladder

  5. man overboard/fall while transferring from pilot ladder to tender

  6. falling from height during inspection of water ballast tank

  7. falling from height after cargo hold cleaning

  8. falling down the stairs on the main deck

  9.  fatal accident during hatch cover operation

  10. fatal accident during cargo operation
  11. lifting appliance failed leading to loss of life
  12. explosion while cutting off the top of a steel drum leading to loss of life
  13. falling overboard during preparation for fishing
  14. falling overboard while returning to home port
  15. man overboard/falling overboard while stowing nets
  16. crew members injured while working on forecastle
  17. crush injuries sustained by two crew members in cargo hold
  18. serious injury while stowing the hook and block of a shipboard crane
  19.  grounding and subsequent constructive total loss
  20. Grounding
  21. collision between a fishing vessel and a passenger ship
  22. collision between a fishing vessel and a general cargo ship, and subsequent sinking of the fishing vessel
  23. collision between an oil tanker and a small aggregates carrier, and subsequent sinking of the small vessel
  24. collision between a Ro-Ro ferry and a sailing yacht
  25. collision between a general cargo vessel and a chemical tanker in a traffic lane
  26. heavy contact with the linkspan of a ferry terminal
  27. flooding and sinking of a cargo vessel with the loss of 6 lives
  28.  tug sank while moored alongside bunker barge
  29. fire on board a fishing vessel, leading to sinking
  30. engine-room fire
  31. fire in the auxiliary engine-room
  32. Electrical fire inside cargo hold
  33. explosion within a ballast tank during hot work

The IMO committee issued an overview for the lessons to be learned, which is also included.

We recommend presenting and analyzing to seafarers the above lessons and conclusions during the next safety meeting(s) held on board  as well as including them in the next safety committee meeting reports.

Failure of lifeboat wire fall – five fatalities on a passenger vessel

27 Φεβρουαρίου, 2013 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο Failure of lifeboat wire fall – five fatalities on a passenger vessel)

Failure of lifeboat wire fall due to corrosion that resulted in five fatalities on the Maltese registered passenger vessel Thomson Majesty.

The MSIU would be very grateful if the attached document is kindly brought to the attention of all safety managers of vessels. The scope behind this Safety Alert is to highlight the potential hazards related to failure of lifeboat wire falls.

Click here to read safety alert.

Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces

25 Σεπτεμβρίου, 2012 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces)

This is a reminder of Resolution A. 1050(27) regarding the revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces aboard Ships.

On 30 November 2011 the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted Resolution A.1050(27) “Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces Aboard Ships”. The revised recommendations replace Resolution A.864(20) published in 1997.

Changes in the Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces aboard Ships :

The revised recommendations update and expand the previous guidance and include a number of changes as follows:

Section 2 – Definitions

Two new definitions have been included in the guidelines for an “adjacent connected space” and an “Attendant”. An “adjacent connected space” is defined as “a normally unventilated space which is not used for cargo but which may share the same atmospheric characteristics with the enclosed space such as, but not limited to, a cargo space accessway”. An “Attendant” is defined as “a person who is suitably trained within the safety management system, maintains a watch over those entering the enclosed space, maintains communications with those inside the space and initiates the emergency procedures in the event of an incident occurring”.

Section 3 – Safety Management for Entry into Enclosed Spaces

This section is new and reads as follows:

  1. “The safety strategy to be adopted in order to prevent accidents on entry to enclosed spaces should be approached in a comprehensive manner by the company.

  2. The company should ensure that the procedures for entering enclosed spaces are included among the key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel and the ship, in accordance with paragraph 7 of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code.

  3. The company should elaborate a procedural implementation scheme which provides for training in the use of atmospheric testing equipment in such spaces and a schedule of regular onboard drills for crews.

  4. Competent and responsible persons should be trained in enclosed space hazard recognition, evaluation, measurement control and elimination, using standards acceptable to the Administration.

  5. Crew members should be trained, as appropriate, on enclosed space safety, including familiarisation with onboard procedures for recognizing, evaluating, and controlling hazards associated with entry into enclosed spaces.

  6. Internal audits by the company and external audits by the Administration of the ship’s safety management system should verify that the established procedures are complied with in practice and are consistent with the safety strategy referred to in paragraph 3.1” (point 1 above.)

Section 4 – Assessment of Risk

This section states that the company should carry out a risk assessment to identify all enclosed spaces on board the ship. This risk assessment should be repeated periodically to ensure it remains valid. The competent person is also reminded that the ventilation procedures for an adjacent connected space may be different from those of the enclosed space itself.

Section 6 – General Precautions

Under “General Precautions” two new points have been added to the previous guidance. The first states that entrances to enclosed spaces should be secured at all times when entry is not required. The second point is intended to minimise the risk of someone mistakenly thinking that a hatch or door that has been opened in order to ventilate an enclosed space means that the atmosphere inside is safe.  An attendant should therefore be posted at the entrance, or a suitable mechanical barrier should be placed across the opening together with a warning sign to prevent accidental entry.

The original recommendations advised that “Ships’ crew should be drilled periodically in rescue and first aid”. This sentence has been replaced with “Ships’ crews with rescue and first aid duties should be drilled periodically in rescue and first aid procedures. Training should include as a minimum:

  1. Identification of the hazards likely to be faced during entry into enclosed spaces;

  2. Recognition of the signs of adverse health effects caused by exposure to hazards during entry; and

  3. Knowledge of personal protective equipment required for entry.”

Section 7 – Testing the Atmosphere

Additional guidance in this section states that: “In some cases it may be difficult to test the atmosphere throughout the enclosed space without entering the space (e.g., the bottom landing of a stairway) and this should be taken into account when assessing the risk to personnel entering the space. The use of flexible hoses or fixed sampling lines which reach remote areas within the enclosed space, may allow for safe testing without having to enter the space”.

Although the previous recommendations contained advice on safe limits for oxygen and flammable and toxic gases, the revised text notes that “National requirements may determine the safe atmosphere range” with regard to oxygen content. A further point has been added advising that steady readings of “not more than 50% of the Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL) of any toxic vapours and gases” should be obtained prior to entry along with a remark that “It should be noted that the term Occupation Exposure Limit (OEL) includes the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL). Maximum Admissible Concentration (MAC) and Threshold Limit Value (TLV) or any other internationally recognised terms.”

Whereas the earlier version advised that “It should be emphasized that pockets of gas or oxygen-deficient areas can exist, and should always be suspected, even when an enclosed space has been satisfactorily tested as being suitable for entry”, the revised text states that “It should be emphasized that the internal structure of the space, cargo, cargo residues and tank coatings may also present situations where oxygen-deficient areas may exist, and should always be suspected, even when an enclosed space has been satisfactorily tested as being suitable for entry, this is particularly the case for spaces where the path of the supply and outlet ventilation is obstructed by structural members or cargo.”

Section 8 – Precautions During Entry

The information in this section has been broadened with the addition of the following;

“Particular care should be exhibited when working on pipelines and valves within the space. If conditions change during the work, increased frequency of testing of the atmosphere should be performed. Changing conditions that may occur include increasing ambient temperatures, the use of oxygen-fuel torches, mobile plant, work activities in the enclosed space that could evolve vapours, work breaks, or if the ship is ballasted or trimmed during the work”, and that “In the event of an emergency, under no circumstances should the attending crew member enter the space before help has arrived and the situation has been evaluated to ensure the safety of those entering the space to undertake rescue operations. Only properly trained and equipped personnel should perform rescue operations in enclosed spaces.”

Section 9 – Additional Precautions for Entry into a Space Where the Atmosphere is Known or Suspected to be Unsafe

Two new sentences have been included in this section advising that “Spaces that have not been tested should be considered unsafe for persons to enter”, and that “Persons entering enclosed spaces should be provided with calibrated and tested multi-gas detectors that monitor the levels of oxygen, carbon monoxide and other gases as appropriate”.

Section 10 – Hazards Related to Specific Types of Ships or Cargo

This section now contains a sub-section on the “Use of Nitrogen as an inert gas” which states that “Nitrogen is a colourless and odourless gas that, when used as an inert gas, causes oxygen deficiency in enclosed spaces and at exhaust openings on deck during purging of tanks and void spaces and use in cargo holds. It should be noted that one deep breath of 100% nitrogen gas will be fatal.”  Additional information can be found in MSC.1/Circ.1401 “Guidelines on Tank Entry for Tankers using Nitrogen as an Inerting Medium”. Any vessel using nitrogen including gas tankers and bulk carriers should also heed this advice.

The sub-section on “Oxygen-depleting cargoes and materials” has been amended slightly to emphasise that the list of products referred to is not exhaustive.

Appendix – Example of an Enclosed Space Entry Permit

The example of an enclosed space entry permit in the Appendix has undergone a number of minor changes:

  1. The question: “Has the space been thoroughly ventilated?” has been expanded with the addition of the words “by mechanical means?”

  2. The requirement for an oxygen content of at least 21% by volume is now accompanied by a note stating that “National requirements may determine the safe atmosphere range.”

  3. The “Pre-Entry Checks” in Section 2 were previously required to be carried out either by the person entering the space or by the authorised team leader. This requirement has been modified and the items listed are “to be checked by each person entering the space”.

  4. Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the permit were previously signed by the “Responsible person supervising entry”.  These sections are now to be signed by the “Attendant”, along with the Master or nominated person.

Members are advised to take account of IMO’s revised guidelines and ensure, so far as is practicable, that their Safety Management System (SMS) procedures and checklists for entering enclosed spaces are amended to reflect the new recommendations. Members should also consider the following advice when carrying out such a review:

Additional Enclosed Space Guidance

Often a question on board will be what constitutes an enclosed space? IMO defines an enclosed space as being one which has any of the following characteristics:

  • Limited openings for entry and exit;

  • Inadequate ventilation; and

  • Is not designed for continuous worker occupancy

The definition includes, but is not limited to, the following compartments:

  1. Cargo spaces

  2. Double bottoms

  3. Fuel tanks

  4. Ballast tanks

  5. Cargo pump-rooms

  6. Cargo compressor rooms

  7. Cofferdams

  8. Chain lockers

  9. Void spaces

  10. Duct keels

  11. Inter-barrier spaces

  12. Boilers

  13. Engine crankcases

  14. Engine scavenge air receivers

  15. Sewage tanks

If it is unclear whether or not a particular compartment is an enclosed space, a risk assessment should be carried out in accordance with IMO recommendations to overcome any doubts. The process of carrying out a risk assessment to identify enclosed spaces should be repeated at regular intervals as circumstances may change.

IMO’s recommendations now make reference to adjacent connected spaces. For example, a forecastle store or deck house fitted with a booby hatch leading to a cargo space may be considered to be such a space. An adjacent connected space may be deficient in oxygen, or flammable or toxic gas may be present, particularly if the seal on the booby hatch or access door to the cargo space is not gas tight. It should also be borne in mind that less obvious areas of a vessel may also exhibit the characteristics of an enclosed space. For example, a recent MAIB Safety Flyer describes a situation where heavy framing on the weather deck surrounding the entrance to a cargo tank impeded the dissipation of cargo vapours.

Another MAIB Safety Flyer draws attention to the fitness of shore contractors engaged to work inside an enclosed space. If concerns arise, they should be refused entry.

Additional permits, as detailed in the vessel’s SMS, may also be required when working in enclosed spaces, such as for hot work or working from a height. The need for other permits such as these should always be considered before work inside an enclosed space is undertaken.

Potential hazards such as unguarded openings, wet or muddy surfaces and lightening holes in intermediate decks within ballast tanks should not be overlooked, nor the need for personnel to be properly equipped to minimise the risk of slips and falls.  An MAIB Investigation Report highlights an accident of this type which took place during a routine inspection of a ballast tank. Particular care must be taken by personnel in such circumstances, and sufficient lighting should be provided to enable safe movement through the space.

Personnel should never enter an enclosed space unless an enclosed space entry permit has been issued before hand in accordance with the procedures set out in the SMS. During the pre-entry checks it should always be assumed that the space is not safe for entry until proved otherwise. Anyone who remains uneasy about whether or not an enclosed space is safe to enter after the necessary precautions have been taken should be encouraged to voice their concerns in case further action is warranted.

The IMO recommendation that “In the event of an emergency, under no circumstances should the attending crew member enter the space before help has arrived and the situation has been evaluated to ensure the safety of those entering the space to undertake rescue operations. Only properly trained and equipped personnel should perform rescue operations in enclosed spaces” is of particular importance. It is a natural human reaction to help others in difficulty, but the urge to do so must be resisted. Instances of someone losing their life after rushing to help a colleague in trouble inside an enclosed space where neither of them followed the correct entry procedures are all too common.

Enclosed Space Entry and Rescue Drills 

Enclosed space entry and rescue drills are, at present, not required by many flag states. However, IMO during the process of drafting amendments to SOLAS that will make enclosed space entry and rescue drills mandatory.

It is anticipated that vessels will need to carry out such drills at least once every two months to ensure that crewmembers are familiar with the actions to be taken if it becomes necessary to rescue someone from inside an enclosed space. In the meantime such drills may be incorporated into the SMS and conducted regularly as a prudent precaution.

Draft amendments to SOLAS regulation III/19 to mandate enclosed space entry and rescue drills were agreed by the Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods, Solid cargoes and Containers (DSC), when it met for its 16th Session.

The draft amendments will be forwarded for review by the Sub-Committees on Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG) and Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW) and then finalized by DSC 17 before submission to the Maritime Safety committee (MSC) for adoption.

The draft amendments are aimed at reducing fatalities linked with enclosed space entry and would require crew members with enclosed space entry or rescue responsibilities to participate in an enclosed space entry and rescue drill at least once every two months.

Each enclosed space entry and rescue drill should include the  checking and use of personal protective equipment required for entry; checking and use of communication equipment and procedures; checking and use of rescue equipment and procedures; and instructions in first aid and resuscitation techniques.

Source: West of England

Nickel Ore Cargoes

24 Αυγούστου, 2012 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο Nickel Ore Cargoes)

Nickel Ore cargoes are exported from a number of countries in the Tropics including Indonesia, the Philippines, and New Caledonia. Four, very serious incidents recently resulted in the sinking of the bulk carriers Jian Fu Star, Nasco Diamond, Hong Wei and Vinalines Queen in very short succession, all of which were carrying nickel ore. These casualties have resulted in the loss of 66 seafarers’ lives in just over 12 months.

All three cargoes in 2010 had been loaded in Indonesia and were destined for China.The common perception is that the cargo was loaded in wet weather and excess moisture in the cargo led to liquefaction.

Nickel is a major component in the manufacture of stainless steel and other corrosion resistant alloys. The addition of nickel to alloys substantially increases their corrosion resistance and strength, and these alloys are widely used in the aerospace, chemical and vehicle industries. Nickel is also used in coins, batteries and armour plating.

Typically the ore comprises a mixture of fine clay-like particles and larger rock sized particles, and it is the former which is prone to liquefaction. The mined ore is usually stored in large open stockpiles before being transported to a ship, so that any drying of the ore depends largely on the prevalent conditions.

In response to the sinking of the bulk carriers in very short succession carrying Nickel Ore , Intercargo, has produced the ‘Intercargo Guide for the Safe Loading of Nickel Ore’.

The Guide primarily aims to explain through use of an easy-to-follow flow-chart how Nickel Ore can continue to be safely shipped, within limitations, whilst raising awareness of the serious issue of cargo liquefaction, and is targeted at the widest possible distribution within industry including shippers, shipowners and ship’s masters’.

Click here to download the “Intercargo guide for the safe loading of Nickel Ore.

You may also like to read:  http://www.britanniapandi.com/en/news_and_publications/risk-watch/risk-watch-archive/risk-watch-2011/vol-18-no-1-mar-2011/index.cfm#a

New Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012

16 Αυγούστου, 2012 | Posted by admin in Χωρίς κατηγορία - (Δεν επιτρέπεται σχολιασμός στο New Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012)

The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 came into force on 31 July 2012.

The new Regulations contain some minor procedural changes to its predecessor but are primarily designed to transpose into UK legislation the requirements of Directive 2009/18/EC which introduce common standards for the investigation of marine accidents across the European Economic Area.

Click here to read the ARI Regulations 2012.

Source: MAIB